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The Marine Corps has embraced the concepts of Operational Maneuver From The ' 
Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) as the next progression in the 
evolution of amphibious warfare. These related concepts envision harnessing emerging 
technologies to allow the projection of naval power ashore faster and from greater 
distances than in ,the past. Additionally, both concepts ~dentify the ability to conduct sea-
based logistics (SBL) as a key requirement for successful implementation. Sea-based 
logistics involves executing a wide range of logistical functions from a sea-base rather 
than from sites traditionally established ashore. Acknowledged enhancements are 
required to realize a complete SBL capability; however, the ability to provide some 
measure of sea-based sustainment exists today. This thesis models the sea-based 
sustainment of Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC» 
forces deployed from Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) ships. Missions are developed 
for analysis; each is coupled with an appropriate force package of personnel and 
equipment density. Sustainment requirements and available transportation capacities are 
then determined and compared for each mission. This comparison along with several 
excursions provides insight into the nature of sea-based sustainment feasibility. It also 
gauges potential limitations for sea-based sustainment. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps has embraced the concepts of Operational Maneuver From The 
Sea (OMFfS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) as the next progression in the 
evolution of amphibious warfare. Recently published OMFfS and STOM concept papers 
from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) articulate the 
enhancements to warfighting capabilities envisioned with OMFfS and STOM as well as 
the requirements for their effective implementation. These concepts envision hamessing 
emerging technologies to allow the projection of naval power ashore faster· and from 
greater distances than in the past. Additionally, both concepts identify the ability to 
conduct sea-based logistics (SBL) as akey requirem~nt for successful implementation. 
Sea-based logistics involves executing a wide rang~ of logistical functions from a sea-
base rather than from sites traditionally "established ashore. Acknowledged enhancements 
are required to realize a complete SBL capability; however, the ability to provide some 
measure of sea-based sustainment exists today. 
This . thesis models the sea-based sustainment of Marine Expeditionary Unit· 
(Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC» forces deployed from Amphibious Ready 
Group (ARG) ships. Missions are developed for analysis; each is" coupled with an 
appropriate force package of personnel and equipment density. Sustainment requirements 
are determined using Marine Corps logistics planning factors (LPFs) for each mission. 
The expected availability of transportation assets is also determined using published 
planning factors. This analysis then models the time required to establish the force ashore 
ix 
as a measure of the level of effort that must be expended before sustainment begins. Also 
modeled is the number of number of MV-22 Osprey sorties required to transport each 
mission's sustainment requirements from the ship-to-objective. Comparing the number 
of sorties required for sustainment to the number of sorties available provides insight into 
the level of competition for transporter assets. This comparison is continued in several 
excursions that test the model's sensitivity to changes in both sustainment requirements 
~d expected transporter availability. Rather than issue a strict feasibility assessment, this 
analysis employs a scale of feasibility based on the percentage of available sorties 
required for sustainment purposes. This scale provides insight into the nature of sea-
based sustainment feasibility. It also demonstrates p<?ten~ial limitations for sea-based 
sustainment. 
Marine Corps planners continue to refine OMFfS, STOM, and SBL. These 
concepts are, however, firmly in place as the templates for future operations. This 
analysis demonstrates the inherent difficulty of sea-based sustainment over the distances 
associated with OMFfS. While these distances may not preclude surface-delivered 
sustainment, 'air-delivery is more likely: Air-delivered sustainment implies a high degree 
of competition for finite available sorties. This competition occurs because sustainment 
requires a significant percentage of available sorties that have traditionally been reserved 
primarily for tactical mobility requirements. This analysis revealed several situations 
where sustainment alone required more than the total amount of available sorties. Water 
and fuel requirements drive the demand for sustainment sorties. This occurs in part 
because of the manner in which they must be transported. Therefore, improvements in 
x 
how water and fuel are transported can have a direct impact on reducing the number of 
sorties required to transport them. Additionally, this analysis addresses a potential mix of 
surface landing craft in an OMFfS environment. The combined results of these' 
examinations suggest that planners should continue to address the exact nature of sea-
based sustainment of forces ashore. They also provide starting points for further, more 
detailed, analysis that can assist in the ongoing concept development. 
xi 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Marine Corps has embraced the concepts of Operational Maneuver From The . . 
Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) as the next progression in the 
evolution of amphibious warfare. Recently published OMFTS and STOM concept papers 
from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) articulate the 
enhancements to warfighting capabilities delivered by OMFTS and STOM as well as the 
requirements for their effective implementation. Among the central requirements for 
each is the capability to sustain forces ashore from a sea-base rather than from the 
traditional support areas ashore that are established subsequent to the landing of initial 
ground forces. 
• I 
Marine Corps forces typically deploy and operate as Marine Air-Ground Task 
Forces (MAGTFs) .. This operational structure provides a perspective from which an 
analysis of sea-based sustainment requirements can be conducted. As its title implies, a 
MAGTF is task-organized to provide operational flexibility; there are, however, standard 
MAGTF organizations. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), 
(MEU(SOC)), is the standard forward-deployed MAGTF. Deployed in the ships of an 
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and possessing a variety of inherent mission 
capabilities, the MEU(SOC) is a viable candidate for sea-based sustainment examination. 
This thesis models the sea":based sustainment of MEU(SOC) forces conducting 
missions ashore. These missions span the spectrum of conflict from peacetime through 
crisis to wartime operations. The forces ashore are described as force packages 
comprised of people and equipment. Specific sustainment requirements are calculated for 
each force package using logistics planning factors (LPFs) from the Marine Corps' 
MAGTF Data Library (MDL) , [Ref. 1]. The data provided by the determination. of 
requirements is subsequently used to accomplish several objectives. First, those 
commodities that generate the most demanding sustainment requirements for each force 
package are determined. These commodities or "drivers" help scope the remaining 
analysis. Secondly, the time required to establish the force package ashore, i.e., transport 
it from ship-to-objective is modeled. This determination yields insight into the level of 
effort that must be expended before sustainment begins. Thirdly, the model estimates the 
effort required to provide sustainment to the force ashore and gauges the potential 
limitations of sea-based sustainment for the selected missions. Finally, the mix of surface 
landing craft in an OMFTS environment is addressed. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the 
organizational structure and operational concepts modeled in this thesis. 
A. MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) 
As documented in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3 (MCDP 3), 
Expeditionary Operations, [Ref. 2], "the MAGTF is the Marine Corps' principal· 
organization for missions across the range of military operations." This tJ:tesis employs a 
single type of MAGTF~ the MEU(SOC). However, a description of the common 
MAGTF structure along with some details about the largest standard MAGrF, the Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF), is useful. . 
As illustrated in Figure 1, all MAGTFs are comprised of four elements: a 
command element (CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element 
(ACE), and a combat service support element (CSSE). These elements are task-
organized, trairied, and equipped to provide an operational decision-maker with what is 
described as a "rheostat of options and capabilities to vary the composition, scope, and 
size of the forces phased ashore." [Ref. 2] 
The CE is normally a standing headquarters. In addition to the resident staff 
functions for the MAGTF Commander, the CE is organized to provide reconnaissance, 
intelligence, and communications capabilities in general support of the entire MAGTF .. 
At the MEF level, th~se functions are organized in the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and 
Intelligence Group (SRIG). 
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Figure 1. MAGTF Structure 
A MAGTF's GCE is normally drawn from the MEF's GCE, the Marine Division. 
The GCE is built around units from one of the Division's infantry regiments reinforced 
with attachments from the artillery regiment, headquarters battalion, combat engineer 
battalion, "light armored reconnaissance battalion, assault amphibian battalion and 
possibly the tank battalion as well. It is task organized to conduct ground operations. 
Logistically, the GCE possesses some organic transportation, supply, main~enance, and 
medical capabilities. 
A MAGTF's ACE .is drawn 'from the MEF's ACE, the Marine Aircraft Wing .. 
The ACE is organized to provide "some or all of the six functions of Marine Aviation: 
antiair warfare, assault support, offensive &ir support, air reconnaissance, electronic 
warfare, and control of missiles and aircraft." [Ref. 2] The Marine Aircraft Wing is 
comp~sed of several types of subordinate units which are designated Groups. Marine 
Aircraft Groups contain fixed and/or rotary-wing aircraft squadrons along with a Marine 
Aviation Logistics Squadron for aviation supply, ordnance, and intermediate aircraft 
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maintenance. The Mari,ne Air Control Group provides anti air missile units, as well as 
requisite command and control communications units. The Marine Wing Support Group 
provides aviation ground support units. Aviation ground support includes motor, 
transportation, expeditionary airfield services, aircraft and structural fire fighting, 
meteorological services, general engineering, bulk fuel services, military police, and 
explosive ordnance disposal. 
A MAGTF's CSSE is drawn from the MEF's CSSE, the Force Service Support 
Group. It is task-organized to provide "a full range of support functions" to the other 
MAGTF elements. [Ref. 2] This range of functions can span the six functions of combat 
service support (CSS): supply, maintenance, transportation, services, health services, and 
general engineeririg support. 
B. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) 
(MEU(SOC)) 
The MAGTF employed in this analysis, the MEU(SOC), represents the standard, 
forward-deployed Marine expeditionary organization. [Ref. 2] 
The special operations capable (SOC) suffix is applied at the completion of an 
"intensive, predeployment training program" during which the MEV's elements must 
demonstrate proficiency in a series of missions that span the spectrum of operational 
intensity. There are seven standing MEV headquarters: the 11th, 13th, and 15th MEVs 
which deploy from California; the 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEVs which deploy from North 
Carolina; and the 31st MEV which deploys from Okinawa, Japan. Given available 
embarkation space on the ships of each MEV(SOC)'s associated ARG, a MEV 
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commander will deploy with the personnel and equipment density he deems appropriate 
for the MEV's area of operation. As a result, each MEV (SOC) deploys with similar but 
not exact duplicate amounts of people and equipment. This thesis employs data taken 
from recent 13th and 15th MEV(SOC) deployments, [Ref. 3] and [Ref. 4] respectively. 
The MEV CE is a standing headquarters and staff. It is augmented for 
deployment by the SRIG with elements of Force Reconnaissance, the Intelligence 
Company that includes Counter-Intelligence, Interrogator-Translator, Signals Intelligence; 
and Topographic capabilities, and the Communications Battalion. 
The MEV GCE is a Battalion Landing Team (BLT). A BLT is built around an 
infantry battalion with its staff, three Rifle Companies, a Weapons Company, and organic 
communications section augmented with an artillery battery, a combat engineer platoon, a 
Light Armored Reconnaissance Company (-), an Assault Amphibian platoon, and in some 
instances, a section of tanks. This analysis does not include tanks. Additionally, with the 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) identified as a key requirement for 
OMFTS, [Ref: 5], it is modeled in place of the current generation AA V. 
The MEV· ACE is designated as a Composite Squadron. It is normally built 
around a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) of 12 CH-46 Sea Knights. As the 
CH-46 is scheduled to be replaced by the MV-22 Osprey, this analysis uses the MV-22 
for modeling purposes. The HMM is augmented by four CH-53E Sea Stallions from a 
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron as well as three VH-IN utility helicopters and four 
AH-IW Sea Cobra attack helicopters, both of which come from a Marine Light Attack 
Helicopter Squadron. A fixed-wing capability is provided by six A V -SB Harriers from a 
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Marine Attack Squadron. Additionally, the HMM is reinforced by elements of the 
Marine Air Control Group and the Marine Wing Support Group. These elements 
contribute antiair, communications, and forward refueling capabilities. 
The MEU CSSE is designated as a MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). The 
MSSG consists of a staff, a supply detachment, a maintenance detachment, a motor 
transport detachment, a landing support detachment, a communications section, a,health 
services detachment which includes a medical doctor and a dentist, an engineer support 
detachment, a military police section, as well as disbursing and postal representatives. 
c. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP (ARG) 
An ARG is the group of amphibious ships in which a MEU(SOC) deploys. 
Additionally, an ARG deploys with a detachment of landi~g craft from an Assault Craft 
Unit (ACU), an 'Explosive Ordnance Disposal'Mobile Unit detachment, and a Navy 
Special Warfare detachment. 
The number and mix of amphibious ships in an ARG varies with operational and 
maintenance availability. However, a typical ARG consists of a general-purpose 
amphibious assault ship (LHAlLHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), and a dock 
landing ship (LSD). The number and mix of landing craft is dependent on the 
amphibious ships represented. Currently, a typical landing craft mix is 4 Landing Craft 
, . 
Air-Cushion (LCAC) and 3 Landing Craft Utility (LCU). OMFfS envisions the LCAC 
as the sole surface landing craft. [Ref. 5] 
In this analysis, the ARG consists of a LHD, a LPD, and a LSD with 7 LCAC; 3 
with the LHD and 4 with the LSD. All aircraft are aboard the LHD. AAA Vs are 
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embarked in the LPD. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that the ARG serves 
as the sea-base from which forces are deployed and then sustained. It is assumed that the 
ARG and embarked MEU(SOC) deploy with the advertised 15 days of sustainment, 
[Ref. 2]. 
D. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA (O~TS) 
The Marine Corps' OMFfS Concept Paper, [Ref. 5], describes OMFTS as "a 
marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare." It is, in fact, the application of 
maneuver warfare concepts to traditional amphibious warfare doctrine. Maneuver 
warfare focuses on the dynamic character of conflict along with the skills and flexibility 
needed to adapt to rapidly changing environments. OMFfS seeks to minimize 
interruptions in tempo by focusing on operational object~ves and using the sea as a 
• f 
maneuver space. 
E. SIDP· TO·OBJECTIVE MANEUVER (STOM) 
The Marine Corps' STOM Concept Paper, [Ref. 6], describes STOM as the 
concept for implementing OMFTS at the tactical level. It seeks to exploit advances in 
mobility, communications, and navigation systems. Whereas traditional amphibious . 
doctrine required securing it beach lodgment from which combat power could be 
projected, STOM treats the beach as' a waypoint to an inland objective: an area that can 
be used for landing throughput but avoided as an area in which to build up. 
F. SEA·BASED LOGISTICS (SBL) 
[Ref. 5] and [Ref. 6] both identify the ability to conduct SBL as a key requirement 
on the road to realizing new concepts. Traditionally, amphibious assaults have been 
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supported from areas established ashore. These areas required a significant amount of . 
time and manpower to establish, secure and operate. The Marine Corps' SBL Concept 
Paper, [Ref. 7], describes the need to reduce shore based support facilities to an absolute 
minimum. Also detailed is the acknowledgement that full implementation of an effective 
SBL system will require improvements in several existing areas along with the 
introduction of new technologies. First, total asset visibility will be needed for both 
~mbarked and en route supplies. Currently, this is limited to the block of embarked 
supplies. Secondly, the capability to selectively offload within the seabase itself must be 
realized. While existing ai?Phibious ships are not completely adequate in this regard, 
there is some opportunity for selective offload of equip~en~ and supplies. 
9 
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
Modeling sea-based logistical sustainment required three distinct but dependent 
inputs: a specific mission, an associated force package, and the sustainment requirements 
for that force package. This section provides an overview of each input; following 
sections will offer greater detail. 
In this type of modeling, analytical merit is predicated upon the mission around 
which the analysis is built. This renders valid mission development especially critical. 
The missions selected for analysis must be operationally reasonable. They must also 
provide enough detail to adequately capture sustainment measures: In this analysis, all 
missions used are consistent with current MEU(SOC) dtpabilities. For each mission, a 
general situation along with information on force composition and a brief concept of 
operations are provided. The~e serve not to capture every nuance associated with the 
mission; rather, they are provided to help the reader picture how a specific mission might 
be characterized. 
With a mission selected, an associated force package was constructed. A force 
package is a description of the people and equipment required for the respective mission. 
The force packages are representative of the capabilities a MEU Commander might 
employ for a "given mission. Specific responses can vary a great deal depending on issues 
ranging from rules of engagement to the level of host nation support opportunities. 
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Additionally, a MEV Commander's operational prerogative will greatly influence how 
missions are met. 
Once a mission and its associated force package were developed, sustainment 
requirements were determined. Determining sustainment requirements involves 
matching the appropriate elements of each force package with their logistics planning 
factors (LPFs) from the MAGTF Data Library, [Ref. 1]. Also involved is conversion of 
sustainment requirements into movement requirements which are then assigned to 
specific transporters, both "air and surface. The determination of movement requirements 
varies by sustainment commodity; this variation is coupled with differences in specific 
transporter roles. 
Balancing" the above inputs against the rules for determining the appropriate LPF 
and transportation mode yields an expected value model of" sorties required to both 
establish the force ashore and then to sustain it. These figures are then matched by 
transporter type to yield expected sorties per day for each type. The time required to 
establish the force ashore is determined by the number of sorties required, the time per 
sortie for each transporter type, and the availability of each transporter. The model then 
provides insight into sustainment feasibility by comparing requirements with available 
sorties. This comparison is first conducted by using the expected values of all inputs. 
Further comparisons are based on excursions in both requirements and sorties available to 
determine the model's sensitivity to these inputs. " 
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B. MISSION DEVELOPMENT 
Missions were developed to provide a viable context for analysis. Five missions 
were selected from the current capabilities of a MEU(SOC) deployed in the amphibious 
ships of an ARG. In this analysis, a mission is characterized by its placement along the 
spectrum of conflict, an associated force package of people an~ equipment, a ship-to-
shore distance, and a shore-to-objective distance. The missions reflect an OMFfS-type 
construct; contrasted with a traditional profile, the significant differences for modeling 
purposes are the movement distances involved, sea-based sustainment, and forces ashore 
that are primarily drawn from the GCE and CSSE with minimal CE and ACE assets 
ashore. Sea-based sustainment does not preclude the assignment of mobile Combat 
Service Support (CSS) assets such as motor transport-to move people, cargo, fuel, and 
water ashore. Instead, the key'difference under a sea-based concept is that all sustainment 
of the force ashore originates from the ARG rather than from established CSS -Areas 
(CSSAs) ashore. An overview of mission characterization is provided in Table 1 at the 
end of this section. 
1. Humanitarian AssistancelDisaster Relief (HAIDR) 
a. . Situation 
A natural disaster occUrs in a Third World nation resulting in a situation 
similar to that faced in Bangladesh following a 1991 typhoon. The deployment of an 
American Joint Task Force (1TF) is hampered by extensive damage to infrastructure such' 
as airfields capable of receiving strategic airlift and ports capable of receiving strategic 
sealift. A deployed MEU (SOC) is detailed to provide an initial stabilizing response. 
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h. Force Composition 
The force for this mission is built around the MEU(SOC)'s capabilities to 
generate and distribute logistical support. . There is a limited need for command and ' 
control from the CE and security forces from the GCE. The GCE also contributes Light 
Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAA Vs) for all 
terrain distribution capability and combat engineers for their construction skills. The 
ACE provides its bulk fuel capability, and some communications assets. The CSSE 
provides the majority of the people and equipment ashore including motor transportation, 
general engineering, and health service capabilities. 
c. Concept of Ops 
Establish force ashore in order to distribute relief supplies, provide potable 
, water, assist in clearing of debris, provide power generation in priority areas, and provide 
medical assistance. The focus of effort is primarily logistical. Storage for potable water, 
fuel, and limited dry supplies. is needed ashore. This requires a blend of sea-based 
sustainment and traditional CSS provision. Sustainment requirements were determined 
only for the force ashore. ' In reality, theMEU (SOC) could very well provide limited 
supplies to people displaced by the disaster in the period before a Non-Governmental or 
Private Volunteer Organization like the Red Cross is able to provide support. 
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2. Semi-Permissive Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO(S-P» 
a. Situation 
A NEO is requested for a limited number of American citizens in a Third 
World nation capital. The operational environment is relatively stable but deteriorating, 
i.e., host government forces are receptive to the NEO but they are not in complete control 
of the affected territory or population. A deployed MEU(SOC) is ordered to conduct the 
mission. 
b. Force Composition 
The NEO mission, regardless of characterization, requires a liaison and 
coordination element drawn primarily from the CEo The semi-perinissive nature of this 
mission requires a security force, in this case a Rifle Company with LA V s from the GCE. 
The . ACE contributes both communications 'and ~Ilti-air capabilities while the CSSE 
provides the manning for the Evacuation Control Center (ECC). The ECC is responsible 
for processing evacuees based upon priorities established by the respective State 
Department staff. 
c. Concept of Ops ' 
Deploy the liaison and coordination element, security force, and ECC. 
Conduct the evacuation. Sustainment requirements will include subsist~nce, Class I; fuel, 
Class III; and ammunition, Class V (W) to the force ashore for the mission's duration. 
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3. Non-Permissive Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO(N-P)) 
a. Situation 
Civil disorder in a Third World nation is rapidly deteriorating into chaos. 
Unlike the semi-pennissive scenario, the host nation has no ability to control the 
situation. As a result, a larger, more capable force is required. A deployed MEU(SOC) is 
ordered to conduct the mission. 
b. Force Composition 
Compared with the semi-pennissive NEO, the primary increase in 
manning for the non-penni~sive NEO is seen in a larger GCE force, which includes a 
command section ashore. Additionally, the ACE provi?es ~ forward refueling capability 
for what could evolve into a mission of longer duration. The CSSEs contribution also 
-grows to deliver a more robust ECe. 
c. Concept of Ops 
Same as the NEO (S-P). 
4. Security Operation 
a. Situation 
A deteriorating situation in a Third World nation threatens U.S. interests in 
the region. The situation is such that security is required at three geographically dispersed 
sites. Artillery support from a centrally located battery is required and feasible. CSS 
requirements can- be delivered toa central location -and distributed via motor 
transportation to each site. 
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b. Force Composition 
The nature of a security operation requires a significant command presence 
from the GCE ashore.. The CE will remain afloat. The GCE also contributes LA V s and 
AAA V s for mobility and anti-mechanized capabilities along with the infantry and 
artillery capabilities. The ACE provides air control communications, refueling and antiair 
assets. The CSSE provides a detachment consisting primarily of motor transportation and 
maintenance assets. 
c. Concept of Ops 
Establish a force ashore to include artillery in order to provide a secure 
perimeter around each site. Conduct the security operation until relieved of the 
requirement. Sustainment requirements include providing Class I, Class ill, and Class V 
(W) to the force ashore. 
5. Enabling Force Operation 
a. Situation 
. An ongoing border dispute between two Third World nations intensifies 
with the invasion of one nation by the other. United States intervention is requested by 
the invaded nation. A deployed MEU (SOC) is directed to seize and secure both a port 
and an airfield to enable the deployment of follow-on forces. 
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h. Force Composition 
The most intense mission analyzed, this mission requires the entire GCE 
ashore. The ACE provides air control communications, refueling and anti air assets. The 
CSSE provides motor transportation, general engineering, landing support, and 
maintenance assets. 
c. Concepto/Ops 
Establish a force ashore to include artillery in order to seize and secure 
port and airfield. Sustainment requirements include providing Class I, Class III, and 
Class V (W) to the force ashore. 
Table 1 summarizes key information for each mission. 
Mission People Distances (miles) HMMWVs 5 -Ton Logistics' Light Advanced M198 
and Trucks Vehicle Armored Assault Howitzers 
Ship-to- Shore-to- Traile~ Systems Vehicles Amphib 
shore objective Vehicles 










NEO(N- CE: 20. 50 50 51 15 . I 15 0 0 




Security CE: 0 50 50 68 20 2 18 I3 6 




Enabling CE: 0 50 50 118 30 5 18 I3 6 
Force GeE: 1260 
Operation ACE 35 
CSSE: 210 
1505 
Table 1. Mission Development Summary 
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c. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION 
The daily sustainment requirements for each mission are functions of the number 
of personnel assigned to that mission, its equipment density, and the mission and phase 
for ordnance requirements. Sustainment requirements are determined by respective 
classes of supply. The classes of supply are: 
I. Subsistence (MREs and Water) 
IT. Individual Equipment 
III. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants 
IV. Construction Materials 
V. Ammunition (W- Ground, A- Aviation) 
VI. Personal Demand Items 
VIT. Major End Items 
VIII. Medical Supplies 
IX. Repair Parts 
X. Non-military Program Material 
This analysis ,uses existing Marine Corps LPFs published in theMAGTF Data" 
Library, [Ref. 1], to model Class I, Class III, and Class V (W) requirements for each 
mission. These classes of supply represent areas with viable LPFs; they also pose the 
greatest logistical challenge in nearly every situation. The remaining classes of supply 
either lack LPFs or they are not considered significant for the types of missions analyzed. 
This analysis, where appropriate, further categorizes requirements into dry (MREs and 
ammunition) and wet (water and fuel). For dry requirements, the weight which must be 
carried is calculated; for wet r.equirements, the number of gallons which must be 
transported is calculated. This categorization is necessary when determining subsequent 
transportation requirements. Once transported ashore, dry requirements are loaded into 
trucks for ground movement and distribution. Ashore, the loading of dry requirements 
may be assisted by a limited amount of material handling equipment, but the bulk of the 
19 
loading will be strong-back labor. Wet requirements, both water and fuel, are transported 
ashore in 500-gallon bladders. Once ashore, water is transferred to either 900-gallon 
containers known as SIXCONS transported on Logistics Vehicle Systems (LVS) or to 
water trailers towed by 5-ton trucks. Once ashore, fuel is transported by SIXCONS on 
L VSs or in 500-gallon bladders loaded in the bed of a 5-ton truc~. 
1. Class I 
Class I (food and water) requirements are a function of the number of people 
involved in the mission. Daily MRE requirements are computed and converted to a 
pounds per day figure using the following equation: 
M =N*D*P 
Where M = total daily MRE requirements in pounds 
N = number of people ash0re. . 
D = daily MRE requirement per person, (3) 
P = weight in pounds of one MRE including packaging, [Ref. 8]. 
At a certain point, hot meals and fresh fruits and vegetables will be provided for at least 
one meal per day. For modeling purposes, MRE figures are used exclusively. 
Daily water requirements are computed using the following equation: 
H=N*W 
Where H = daily water requirement in gallons 
N = number of people ashore 
W = daily water planning factor in gallons, [Ref. 1]. 
The range for W provided in [Ref. 1] is 10 gal/day to 24 gal/day. In this analysis, 10 
gal/day is used exclusively. 
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2. Class III 
Class ill (fuel) requirements are a function of equipment type. In this analysis, a 
single fuel type (F-44) is modeled. For each item of equipment, a daily requirement is 
computed based on planning factors for gallons per hour and operating hours per day. 
This relationship is reflected in the following equation: 
F=L X/Y/E j 
j 
Where F = total daily fuel requirement in gallons 
Xj = fuel use in gallons per hour for equipment type j, [Ref. 1] 
Yj = operational hours per day for equipment type j, [Ref. 1] 
Ej = n~mber of equipment type j ashore. 
3. Class V (W) 
Class V (W) (ground ammunition) requirements are a function of ammunition 
type, weapon type, threat, the particular MAGTF element employing the weapon, and the 
phase of combat. In this analysis, a composite threat is assumed for computing all class 
V (W) requirements. This threat level is intended for uncertain environments where the 
opposition is primarily infantry and there is potential for reinforcement by mechanized 
. forces. 
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Daily ammunition requirements can be computed from the following equation: 
Where A = total daily ammunition requirement in pounds 
Qij = rounds per day of type i used by weapon type j, [Ref. 1] 
Yi = weight of ammunition type i round in pounds, [Ref. 8] 
Vj = number of weapon type j ashore. 
4. Summary 
Table 2 summarizes sustainment requirements for each mission .. 
Assault Rate Sustained Rate 
Mission MREs(lbs) Water (gals) Fuel (gals) Ammunition (tons) Ammunition (tons) 
HAlDR 1826 4170 4924 0 0 
NEO(S-P) 1515 3460 3924 6 2 
NEO(N-P) 2851 6510 4749 7 2 
Security Op 3434 7840 7177 25 6 
Enabling Force Op 6592 15050 9605 31 7 
Table 2. Mission Sustainment Requirements 
D. TRANSPORTERS 
This analysis employs both air and surface transporters. In accordance with 
OMFTS, the air transporters are the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E Sea Stallion. The 
surface transporters are the LCAC and the AAA V. 
1. Assumptions 











b. B.oth air and surface transporters are used in establishing the force 
ashore. For sustainment, only the MV-22 is used. 
c. During establishment, personnel are transported via MV-22, LCAC 
and AAA V, with the majority moving via MV-22. All equipment, except M198 
Howitzers, is moved via LCAC. M198s are moved via CH-53E. 
d. During sustainment, all cargo is transported externally. 
2. Transporter Availability 
Estimating the number of sorties available per day for each type of air and 
surface craft represents the final modeling input. With availability determined, 
comparisons between requirements and available resources can be made. Availability 
determination is conducted separately for air and surface assets. 
a. Air 
Sorties available per day are a function of the number of each type 
of aircraft, a projected readiness, and a sustained sortie rate per day planning factor. This 
relationship is seen in the following equation: 
Sj=LN/ R/SSRj 
j 
Where Sj = expected total of available sorties for aircraft type j per day 
Nj = number of aircraft of type j deployed 
Rj = expected readiness of aircraft type j, [Ref. 8]. 
SSRj = expected sustained daily sortie rate for aircraft type j, 
[Ref. 1] and [Ref. 9]. 
Fractional results are rounded down. 
The actual allocation of these sorties to particular tasks is completed by the MEU(SOC) 
st~f as required. During the establishment period, readiness of all air transport types is 
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assumed to be 100%. This is a reasonable assumption given that there is adequate time to 
prepare for the mission. Sustainment, unlike establishment, implies operations of 
extended duration. For this reason, sustained readiness will be less than 100% as all 
aircraft will undergo maintenance periods, either routine or emergent, that will remove 
them from flying status for the duration of the maintenance period. 
Table 3 reflects the figures used and the values derived for all aircraft types 
modeled. 
Aircraft Type (j) Sj Nj Rj SSRj 
MV-22 (Establishment) 48 12 1.0 4, (internal cargo) 
MV-22 (Sustainment) 30 12 .85 3, (external cargo) 
CH-53E (Establishment) 10 4 1.0 2.5, (external cargo) 
CH-53E (Sustainment) 6 4 .60 2.5, (external cargo) 
Table 3. Air Sortie Generation Summary. 
h. Surface 
In this analysis, LCAC are employed only in the establishment phase. For 
this reason, LCAC availability is not determined as sorties per LCAC. Instead, only the 
~xpected number of LCAC available to transport equipment is computed. This value is 
computed from: 
L=n*r 
Where L = number of available LCAC 
n = number of LCAC deployed with the ARG 
r = expected LCAC readiness, [Ref. 8] 
Fractional results are rounded down. 
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In this analysis, it is assumed that n = 7 and r = .80, so the number of available LCAC is 5 
per day. Although not accounted for in this analysis, use of the LCAC for an extended 
duration, such as in a sustainment phase, will require consideration of a operational crew' 
day constraint. For the missions modeled in this analysis, it reasonable to assume that the 
constraint on LCAC availability would consist solely of a readiness factor. 
E. MODELS 
Models were constructed for both establishment of the force ashore and for its 
subsequent sustainment. The goal of modeling the establishment phase is to capture the 
time required for each force package to move from ship-to-objective. This exercise 
serves to demonstrate the fact that transporters used in sustainment must also operate to 
establish the force. Modeling the sustainment phase is aimed toward capturing the 
number of sorties required to meet the force's daily sustainment requirements. Since 
transporter assets must also support the 'tactical mobility requirements of the force ashore, 
comparing the number of sorti.es required to satisfy daily sustainment requirements with 
the number of sorties available provides insight into the level of competition for 
transporter assets. 
1. Establishment 
Establishing the force ashore consists of transporting personnel, 
equipment, and two days of supply (DOS) from ship-to-objective. Deploying with two 
DOS for MREs and ammunition is generally attainable; however, water and fuel amounts 
are constrained by the number of mobile-loaded containers and towed water trailers 
deployed with the force. As a result, larger forces may be unable to move ashore with 
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two DOS of water or fuel. The net effect on sustainment is that these commodities will 
require resupply soon after establishment. 
Personnel are moved primarily via MV -22; the only exceptions are vehicle' 
operators who move ashore with their equipment via LCAC and those people assigned to 
AAA Vs. Some supplies are man-packed, but most are loaded in equipment. With the 
exception of AAA Vs and M198 howitzers, all equipment is moved from ship-to-shore via 
LCAC. Once ashore, equipment delivered by LCAC self-deploys to the objective. 
AAA Vs self-deploy from ship-to-objective. When required, M198 howitzers are 
transported by CH-53Es from ship-to-objective. 
The aforementioned components are modeled as sorties required to establish the 
force ashore. A' sortie is defined as a round-trip movement: ship-to-shore-to-ship for 
LCACs and ship-to-objective-to-ship for air assets. AAA V sorties are ship-to-objective 
only. 
a. Air 
A MV-22 can carry 24 combat-loaded Marines, [Ref. 8]. Therefore, the 
number of MV-22 sorties required for people movement is given by: 
SMV-22 =%4 
Where N = number of people to be transported via MV-22 
Fractional results are rounded up. 
A CH-53E can carry one M198 Howitzer, [Ref. 8]. Therefore, the number of CH-53E 
sorties required is given simply by the number of howitzers requiring transport. 
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h. Surface 
Rather than determine LCAC sorties solely based on the LCAC's weight 
capacity, this model also considers cargo square footage so as to prevent exceeding area 
or weight limitations. Even so, the method used in this model does not seek to fill every 
square foot available. Instead, it represents capacity by vehicle type, i.e., the LCAC's 
capacity for a load consisting exclusively of one vehicle type. In other words, all loads 
are homogenous by vehicle type. While this does not reflect how an actual offload would 
occur, it does provide a legitimate approximation for determining the number of sorties 
required. To this end, vehicles were grouped into four categories: HMMWVs, 5-ton 
trucks, Logistics Vehicle Systems (LVS), and Light Armored Vehicles (LA V). All 
HMMWVs and trailer-mounted equipment are gro?pedin the HMMWV category; the 
remaining categories consist solely of their namesake. Given this method, the number of 
LCAC Sorties required to establish the force can be computed from: 
SI,CAC = L Vj~. 
j Ie) 
Where Vj = number of vehicle type j requiring movement ashore 
Cj = the number of type' j vehicles that comprise one 
homogenous LCAC load, [Ref. 10]. 
Fractional results rounded up . 
. In this analysis,.AAA Vs do not· conduct round-trip sorties. As a result, for the 
missions in which they are modeled, AAA V s contribute people movement at their 
capacity for one trip only. AAA Vs are capable of moving a crew of 3 and 18 passengers 
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for a total of 21 combat-loaded Marines. In the HAlDR mission, the AAA V is modeled 
as a supply transporter; therefore, only 5 people are associated with each AAA V for 
establishment purposes. 
Table 4 summarizes the sorties by mission and transporter type required for 
establishing the force ashore. 
Mission MV-22 CH-53E LCAC 
HAlDR 6 0 19 
NEO(S-P) 9 0 12 
NEO(N-P) 20 0 14 
Security Op 13 6 18 
Enabling Force Op 38 6 26 
Table 4. Establishment Sortie Requirements 
2~ Time Required To Establish The Force Ashore 
The time required for establishing the force ashore is a function of the 
number of sorties required for movement, the maximum available sorties per day for each 
transporter type, the distances involved, and the transporter's performance characteristics. 
a. Air 
The time required to move the air-transported component of a force 
package ashore, T Air, is a function of the time per sortie, the number of sorties required, 
and the number of available aircraft. Time per sortie, T s, is calculated using four 
components: loading time, ingress flight time, unloading time, and egress flight time. 
Values for loading and unloading times were taken from [Ref. 8] .. Flight times are 
calculated by dividing the ship-to-objective distance in miles by speed in knots. Egress 
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flight time is modeled differently from ingress flight time due to a need to exit via a 
different route or evade enemy air defenses. T Air is given by: 
Where T Air = total air movement time in hours 
T s = time per sortie in hours 
Ns = number of sorties required 
NA = number of available aircraft 
The model does not include any allowance for weather related restrictions which could 
preclude the MEU(SOC) from flying any sorties on a given day. 
h. Surface 
The surface component of establishing a force ashore is modeled in waves. 
A wave equates to a group of LCAC sorties conducted concurrently. Each wave can have 
the follo.wing time components: loading time, LCAC ingress time, unloading time, LCAC 
egress time, and ground equipment transit time to the objective. The first and last waves 
will have different total times than the intervening waves. If T 1 is the time required for 
the first wave, T 2 is the time required for each middle wave, and T 3 is the time required 
for the last wave, then .total surface movement time, Tsurface, is given by 
Tsurface = TI +(T2 * C)+T3 
where C = (total number of waves - 2). 
The first wave of LCACs is pre-loaded with equipment. Therefore, Tl does not 
involve a load time component, nor does it include a ground equipment transit time. 
component. T 2 does not include a ground equipment transit time component. T 3 includes 
the ground equipment transit time component but omits the LCAC egress time 
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component. Therefore, surface movement time ends with the final shore-to-objective 
ground equipment transit. The total number of waves required is calculated by dividing 
the required number of LCAC loads by the number of available LCACs and rounding up. 
LCAC Ingress and LCAC Egress times are equal; they are calculated by dividing the 
ship-to-shore distance in miles by the expected LCAC speed in knots. LCAC speeds, 
load times and unload times are from [Ref. 11). Ground equipment transit time is 
calculated by dividing shore-to-objective distance in miles by average ground speed in 
miles per hour. An average ground speed of 25 miles per hour was used in all cases. 
While AAA V s are part of the model's surface inovement, the time they require to 
move from ship-to-objective is a subset of the time required for moving equipment ashore 
via LCAC and may therefore be ignored. The model does not· account for potential 
weather or sea-state delays. It also does not accou!lt for time required for mine-clearing 
operations, additional time needed for ·LCAC queuing at the ship, or for obstacles ashore 
slowing movement to the objective. 
3. Sustainment 
S'ustainment transportation demands depend on the amount of supplies 
required ashore. In this model, all sustainment is moved via MV-22 external lifts. 
Whereas surface movement is capable of delivering greater amounts f~om the ship to the 
shore than air movement, air movement is more consistent with OMFTS ideals because it 
obviates the need for' maintaining a' secure beach landing area and secure lines of 
communication from the beach to the objective area. It should be reiterated that OMFTS 
does not preclude the use' of the beach for throughput of either forces or sustainment, 
30 
[Ref. 5]. Among air assets, the MV-22 is preferred to the CH-53E due to its greater 
speed, larger numbers in the ACE, and higher projected availability. CH-53Es can be 
thought of as on-call for any heavy-lift mission requirements such as the movement of 
artillery. 
Sustainment sorties are allocated to either dry or wet requi!ements. Therefore, dry 
and wet requirements are treated separately. 
a. Dry 
MREs and ammunition are treated as continuous variables and the 
number of sorties required to transport dry sustainment requirements, Sdry, is: 
Where Dj =:= aplount of commodity j required in pounds 
Cd!),= MV-22 external lift capacity in pounds, (10,000), [Ref. 8]. 
Fractional results rounded up. 
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h. Wet 
Fuel and water are treated as discrete variables because their 
movement is limited not. solely by weight, but also by the capacity of the containers. in . 
which they are transported. This relationship is seen in the following equations: 
NC =L WYcC 
j 
s - NC/ 
wet - /LC 
Where NC = number of wet containers required ashore per day 
Wj = amount of wet commodity j required daily in gallons 
CC = container capacity in gallons, (500 gallons) 
LC = MV-22 sortie external container lift capacity, (2), [Ref. 8] 
Swet = number of sorties required to transport wet requirements. 
Fractional results rounded up. 
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IV. RESULTS 
This chapter provides model results as well as a discussion of the insight yielded 
by these results. Results are presented separately for establishment and sustainment 
categories. 
A. ESTABLISHMENT 
Table 5 reflects the results of modeling the time required to establish each 
mission's force package ashore. 
Mission Surface (Hrs) Air (Hrs) 
HAlDR 5.0 0.8 
NEO(S-P) 11.3 1.3 
NEO(N-P) 11.3 . 2.5 
Security Op 14.5 2.5 
Enabling Force Op 21.0 5.0 
Table 5. Time to Establish the Force Ashore· 
As expected, as force packages increase in size, the time required to establish the force 
ashore increases. The model's requirement to move all equipment except artillery via 
surface ensures that the surface movement time is significantly longer than the air 
movement time. Additionally, this disparity between surface movement time and air 
movement time demonstrates the ongoing requiren;tent for synchronization between 
surface and air movements in an OMFTS environment. 
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B. SUSTAINMENT 
Table 6 reflects the numbers of sustainment sorties required for either assault rate 
or sustained rate LPFs. The difference between assault and sustained rate LPFs is 
reflected only in Class VCW) (ammunition) requirements; Class I (food and water) and 
Class III (Fuel) requirements do not vary with rate. Also re:Q.ected is the number of 
sorties available for tasks other than sustainment for each mission. These tasks include 
tactical mobility, deception, medevac, and emergency maintenance support. 
Assault Rate Sustained Rate 
Remaining Required Remaining 
Required Assault Available MV·22 Sustained Rate Available MV·22 
Mission Rate Sorties Sorties Sorties Sorties 
HAlDR 10 20 10 20 
NEO(S·P) 9 21" S' 22 
NEO(N·P) 13 17 12 IS 
Security Op f 21 9 17 13 
Enabling Force Op 32 ·2 27 3 
Table 6. Sustainment Sortie Requirements 
With the exceptio~ of the Enabling Force Operation's assault rate requirements, 
sufficient MV-22 sorties are generated to meet each force's daily sustainment 
requirements. ~ecall that Table 3 indicated a total of 30 available MV-22 sorties each· 
day. The remaining available sortie columns provide an important and perhaps more 
telling result. Remaining available sorties are simply the difference between total 
availability and sustainment requirements. This figure represents the number of daily 
sorties a commander can expect to have remaining if he fully meets the force's' 
sustainment requirements. It is reasonable to assume that as missions increase in 
intensity, the number of sorties required for tasks such as tactical mobility, medevac, 
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deception, and emergen~y maintenance support will approach or exceed the number of 
sorties required for sustainment. For example, 8 MV-22 Sorties, or more than 25% of 
daily available sorties, are. required to relocate one Rifle Company with Weapons' 
Company attachments. For this reason, it becomes very likely for the more demanding 
missions that sorties available will not satisfy total sortie requirements. This implies a 
limitation on the feasibility of sea-based sustainment in support of OMFTS. 
The nature of this analysis does not allow for a strict feasibility determination. 
Instead, it is helpful to think of levels of feasibility in terms of the percentage of total 
sorties required for a particular mission's sustainment. One manner of assessing the 
feasibility of sea-based sustainment via MV-22 for the missions analyzed is found in the 
traffic light paradigm. Specifically, 'Green' represents sustainment sortie requirements 
up to 50% of the total available sorties, 'Y~llow' represents from 50% to 100%, and 
'Red' is beyond 100%. In other words, an assessment of 'Green' indicates that a 
commander should be able to meet all tasks with available sorties. 'Yellow' indicates 
that a commander can anticipate difficulty in meeting all tasks with available sorties. 
'Red' indicates that sustainment alone consumes all available sorties. Table 7 reflects a 
feasibility assessment using these definitions. 
Sustained 
Mission Assault Rate Rate 
HNDR Green Green 
NEO(S·P) Green Green 
NEO(N·P) Green Green 
Security Op Yellow Yellow 
Enabling Force Op Red Yellow 
Table 7. Sustainment Feasibility Assessment 
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Detennining which commodities demand the most sorties can help identify areas 
where improvements may be of the greatest benefit. Figure 2 reflects the division of total 
sustainment sortie requirements between wet and dry commodities. 
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Figure 2. Sustainment Sortie Breakdown 
Figure 2 helps demonstrate the extent to which the wet (water and fuel) 
requirements drive sustainment sortie numbers for the missions analyzed. It is 
particularly telling that the wet requirements for the most pennissive mission, the 
HAlDR, exceed the dry requirements for the most operationally intense mission, the 
Enabling Force Operation. The fact that the HAlDR employs. 2/3 the personnel and 112 




The results detailed in Chapter IV were derived from the expected values for . 
sustainment requirements and transportation capacity. It is, therefore, especially 
important to examine how the models used react to changes in the input values. This 
examination is a type of sensitivity analysis that takes the form of three excursions. First, 
sustainment requirements were varied upward from the base case that used the LPFs from 
the MAGTF Data Library, [Ref. 1]. Second, the effect of decreases in sortie availability 
over time was examined. Finally, the impact of augmenting the MV-22 with CH-53E 
sorties not required for heavy lift tasks was examined. 
A. SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS 
. As discussed in Chapter IV, suffident sorties are generated for sustainment 
requirements for all but the most demanding mission. Therefore, it can be surmised that a 
sustainment problem is unlikely when actual usage is less than that projected using the 
LPFs from [Ref. 1]. But what if actual consumption exceeds the requirements projected 
. . 
using the LPFs? This question was addressed by adding a percentage' factor to ·the 
original requirement and then comparing the sorties required for transporting the 
increased amounts against the available sorties. MRE usage was not varied, however; the 
same number of people will not consume more MREs than the original requirement. All 
other commodity requirements (water, fuel, and ammunition) were subject to variation. 
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Table 8 reflects the results of this excursion using the traffic light paradigm. If 
feasibility changes due to an LPF increase, that particular cell is highlighted. For 
example, at LPF+ 10%, the Enabling Force Operation's sustained rate sortie requirements· 
changes from the 'Yellow' reflected in Table 7 to 'Red'. 
Assault Rate Sustained Rate 
Mission LPF+lO% LPF+25 % LPF+50% LPF+lO% LPF+25% LPF+50% 
HAlDR Green Green Yellow Green Green Yellow 
NEO(S-P) Green Green Green Green Green Green 
NEO(N-P) Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow 
Security Op Yellow Yellow Red Yellow Yellow Yellow 
Enabling Force Op Red Red Red Red Red Red 
... Table 8. Sustamment FeasIbIlIty Assessment ExcursIOn Results 
As expected, increased requirements demand increased sorties. The key insight yielded 
by this excursion is the fact that actual usage above LPF projections serves to push the 
point where sustainment requires all available sorties down the spectrum of operational 
intensity. In other words, sustaining smaller forces involved in less intense operations 
becomes more difficult. This observation is especially applicable to an OMFTS 
environment where the high tempo of operations is not likely to wane. It also is a 
quantitative indication of why it is so desirable to effect a decrease in the amount of 
sustainment required. 
B. SUSTAINMENT SORTIE AVAILABILITY 
The expected number of MV-22 sorties available that was used in the modeling 
process assumed aircraft readiness was constant. It is reasonable to assume that aircraft 
readiness will decrease during extended operations. This decrease in readiness over time 
can result from many factors, e.g. combat attrition, accidents, corrective maintenance 
requirements, or preventive maintenance required at specific operational hour limits. 
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How does this reduction in readiness over time affect the ability to sustain missions 
ashore? This question was addressed through the following equation: 
St = N * Rt * SSR 
Where St = the number of sorties available on day t 
N = the number of MV-22's deployed, (12) 
Rt= MV-22 readiness on day t 
SSR = MV-22 sustained external cargo sortie rate, (3), [Ref. 9]. 
Readiness equates to a Mission Capable rate. It was modeled as follows: the range for t 
is 1 to 7 days with Rl = .85 and R7 = .70. Figure 3 compares the impact of decreased 
readiness over this period on available MV-22 sorties with the sustainment requirements 
from t.he Enabling Force Operation. 
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Figure 3. Decreased Available Sorties Excursion 
The graph depicts ~ow assault rate and sustained rate requirements might be apportioned 
in an actual operation. In this case, two days of assault rate ·sustainment are followed by 
five days of sustained rate sustainment. The net effect of decreased readiness is decreased 
available sorties. As a result, sustainment sortie requirements consume an increasing 
39 
percentage of available sorties. For instance, the graph reflects feasibility for the Enabling 
Force Operations' sustained rate requirement shifting from 'Yellow' to 'Red' on day 5. 
C. CH-S3E ASSISTANCE IN SUSTAINMENT 
As detailed in Chapter IV, wet requirements generate the greatest transportation 
demands. What if available CH-53E sorties were employed to mitigate this situation? 
The MEU(SOC),s four CH-53E aircraft generate six sorties per day, (Table 3). FOJ,lr CH-
53E sorties using the 2400 gallon fuel capacity of the internally loaded Tactical Bulk Fuel 
Distribution System can meet all daily fuel requirements for the missions examined in 
this analysis. A MV -22 is limited to two 5OO-gallon bladders carried externally. 
Therefore, it can be seen that, even when fractional sorties are discounted, one CH-53E 
fuel sortie allows two MV-22 sorties to be reassigned to non-sustain.ment tasks. 
It should be noted that no system such as the Tactical Bulk Fuel Distribution .. 
System exists for the transportation of bulk water. Therefore, the CH-53E's assistance in 
water distribution is not as significant. Specifically, a CH-53 can lift three 5OO-gallon 
bladders where the MV-22 is again limited to two 5OO-gallon bladders. 
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VI. ROLE FOR THE LCU IN OMFTS 
The LCAC is envisioned as the only surface landing craft in an OMFfS 
environment. Currently, an ARG I MEU(SOC) deploys with a mix of two types of 
landing craft: the LCAC and the LCU. Comparatively, LCACs are capable of 
significantly faster speeds. Also, their air-cushion characteristic allows them access to 
many areas where conventional landing craft like the LCU are not usable. LCUs, 
however, offer a significantly larger weight capacity and enough available area to carry 
larger amounts of certain equipment types. Should LCUs be ignored in OMFfS or are 
there circumstances in which their employment is advantageous? 
This question was addressed by creating a linear program to determine at what 
ship-~o-shore distance, if any, a MEU(SOC) might consider including LCUs along with 
LCACs in the establishment of combat power ashore: 
A. MODEL 
Indices 
i landing craft type (LCA-C, LCU) 
j vehicle type (HMMWV, 5-ton, LVS, LAV) 
Data 
T~ = round trip sortie time for landing craft type i (minutes) . 
NUMREQj = number of vehicles of type j required ashore 
MAXi = max number of sorties required if landing craft type i is used exclusively 
CAPACITY ij = number of vehicles of type j that can be loaded on a landing craft 
of type i 
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Decision Variables 
Yij = number of landing craft type i sorties assigned to transport type j vehicles 
Formulation 
min L L TIME i *Yij 
j i 
s.t. 
L CAPACITY ij * Yij ;::: NUMREQ j 'if j 
i 
L Y;j~ MAX i 'if i 
j 
Yij E integer 
The objective function seeks to minimize the total time required to move 
the respective force package from ship-to-shore. The first constraint ensures that the 
-required amounts of type j vehicles are assigned to a sortie. As was done previously in 
modeling LCAC sortie requirements for establishing the force ashore, vehicles were 
assigned to four categories: HMMWVs, 5-ton trucks, LAVs, and Logistics Vehicle 
Systems (LVS). Again, HMMWV figures include both HMMWVs and trailers; the 
. remaining vehicle categories are comprised solely of their namesake. The second 
constraint ensures that the total number of landing craft type i sorties used does not 
exceed a set maximum. A final requirement is that the number of sorties assigned be 
integral. 
The TIMEi, NUMREQj , and MAXi data were taken from the Enabling 
Force Operation. MAXi is number of sorties that would be required if landing craft type i 
was used exclusi~ely. CAPACITYij is from [Ref. 10]. The linear program was solved 
using the What's Best solver in an Exce.l Spreadsheet. 
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B. RUNS 
The model was run using two separate operational scenarios. The first scenario 
involved sortie times that reflected launching LCACs and LCUs at the same distance 
from shore. The second scenario was adapted from the Marine Corps' STOM Concept 
Paper, [Ref. 6]. It describes AAAVs launching at 25 nautical miles from shore while 
LCAC launch from greater distances. This motivates the question of including LCUs if 
they are launched at a different distance than LCACs. Using LCAC sortie times from 50 
nautical miles and LCU sortie times from various distances tested this scenario. 
c. RESULTS 
Table 10 indicates the results of the various model runs. 
Ship-to-Shore LCAC in Op~imal LCU in Optimal 
Scenario Distance Solution Solution 
1 < 10nm X X 
>lOnm X 
LCAC=50nm X X LCU<25nm 2 LCAC=50nm 
LCU>25nm X 
Table 10. Summary of Landing Craft Mix Linear Program Results 
OMFfS' envisions ship-to-shore standoff distances large enough to protect the 
ARGfrom shore-based missile threats. In situations where this threat is realized, the 
required standoff will certainly be greater than 10 nautical miles. In that case, the LCU 
will not be a viable option due to its slow speed. However, if the environment is more 
permissive, the LCU may complement the LCAC. The results of the second scenario' 
runs indicate a potential role for the LCU in OMFfS. A more specific interpretation of 
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the second scenario's results is that the LCU's slow speed alone is not enough to prevent 
it from contributing positively to an operation with OMFfS-type ship-to-shore distances. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
OMFfS and STOM seek to minimize the support footprint ashore through sea 
basing. They do not, however, preclude establishing support ashore when necessary. 
Neither do they mandate air-only sustainment of forces ashore when delivery of supplies 
via surface means is practicable. These facts reflect the pragmatic nature of the planners 
crafting the development of these concepts. Surface delivered sustainment is deCidedly 
slower than air-delivery; it also requires secure ot: at least defended lines of 
communication ashore. If these restrictions are not binding, however, surface delivered 
sustainment offers the ability to transport greater amounts of material at one time. This 
notwithstanding, it is reasonable to assert that Marine Corps' planners envision an 
environment with n? established sl:lpport areas ashore and ,air-only 'sustainment of forces 
ashore as the operational template for which OMFfS and STOM are best suited. This 
analysis provides some measure of how quickly air-only, sea-based sustainment of forces 
ashore becomes a difficult proposition. 
Although, this analysis does not allow a strict feasibility assessment of sea-based 
sustainment, it is possible to identify several implications and potential areas of interest 
as the development of OMFfS, STOM, and SBL continues. This analysis demonstrates 
the inherent difficulty of sea-based sustainment over the distances associated with 
, 
OMFfS. Air-delivered sustainment implies a high degree of competition for finite 
available sorties. This competition occurs because sustainment requires a significant 
percentage of available sorties that have traditionally been reserved primarily for tactical 
mobility requirements. This analysis revealed several situations where sustainment alone 
required'more than the total amount of available sorties. ·Water and fuel requirements 
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drive the demand for sustainment sorties. This occurs in part because of the manner in 
which they must be transported. Therefore, improvements in how water and fuel are 
transported can have a direct impact on reducing the number of sorties required to 
transport them. Additionally, this analysis addresses a potential mix of surface landing 
craft in an OMFfS environment. The combined results of these examinations suggest 
that planners should continue to address the exact nature of sea-based sustainment of 
forces ashore. They also provide starting points for further, more detailed analysis that 
can assist in the ongoing concept development Areas of interest for extension or further 
study are numerous. They include the impact of surface-delivered sustainment, the time 
required per day to transport sustainment requirements, the impact of selective offload 
requirements on ARG embarkation capacities, as well ~ the modeling in greater detail of 
sorties required for tacticaJ D;1obility, medevac, deception, and emergency maintenance· 
support. 
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